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Introduction
Authentication is, intuitively, the process of reliably verifying the identity of someone or something. This is usually achieved by some form of binding; e.g., users are recognized on the net by some information (e.g., password or key) only they know. Authentication has, however, many facets. For instance, in a communication protocol, entity authentication commonly refers to the capability of identifying the other party engaged in a protocol session, while message authentication usually refers to authenticity of both the origin and the content of the exchanged message.
Even if there is a widespread agreement on what authentication should be, under a closer scrutiny one realizes that it is a very slippery security property. As a matter of fact, formal deÿnitions of authentication have rarely been given, not widely agreed upon, usually not compared and only recently proposed in the literature (see, e.g., [3, 16, 18, 27] ). This is sometimes due to the fact that we ÿrst need a formal model on which the problem is deÿned (and this is often a source of possible proliferation of di erent proposals) and then a formal deÿnition of authentication w.r.t. the chosen model. Moreover, even when a formal deÿnition is given, usually this is not (easily) comparable to others, due to di erent mathematical assumptions of the model.
The main aim of our current research is to ÿnd a uniform approach for deÿning the many variants of security properties (authentication in particular) in such a way that they can all be seen as speciÿc instances of a general scheme. This is badly needed in order to compare, classify and evaluate the merits of the various deÿnitions and possibly provide general and e ective analysis techniques that can be applied suitably for all properties.
To this aim, in [14] we have presented a process algebra, called CryptoSPA, 1 that is expressive enough to model a large class of systems, e.g., (non-mobile) security protocols. CryptoSPA has been chosen as the common model for comparing the various properties through the general, unifying scheme, called GNDC. The main idea behind GNDC is the notion of non-interference, which was proposed many years ago [15] in a completely di erent context to study information ow in computer systems and was widely studied in [9, 10, 21] . Roughly, a system satisÿes a security property if its behavior cannot be altered (hence, with no interference) when executed in a hostile environment. This property is a direct generalization for security protocols of the property of non-deducibility on composition (NDC for short) that we proposed in [9, 10] .
Some security properties (e.g., CSP authentication of [18] and non-repudiation as in [26] ) have been shown as instances of our general scheme in [12, 14] . The main goal of this paper is to show that the rather di erent authentication property deÿned by Abadi and Gordon [2] , once adapted for CryptoSPA, can be formulated in our framework as well, under some reasonable, mild assumptions. This new formulation of the property deÿned in [2] is interesting for the following reasons:
• It strengthens our claim that non-interference plays a key role in the speciÿcation and analysis of security protocols, as also the spi-authentication property can be recast in the same scheme.
• It helps in comparing the various authentication properties among them and with respect to other di erent security properties, as they are now deÿned uniformly (in the same language) as instances of the same general scheme. For instance, here we show that in a particular (but reasonable) situation the Agreement authentication property deÿned in [18] is stronger than spi-authentication [2] .
• It contributes to clarify the spi authentication property: in fact, in its original definition, based on a testing-like semantics, the tester plays both the role of intruder and observer at the same time; in its new equivalent formulation, the two roles are clearly separated. Moreover, the new formulation does not require the explicit deÿnition of the secure speciÿcation.
• It may contribute with analysis techniques for spi-authentication: the new formulation is based on NDC and techniques for the veriÿcation of NDC are already available, also implemented in existing tools [6, 7, 10] . The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we deÿne the model; in Section 3 we adapt to our model the notion of message authentication of the spi-calculus; Section 4 describes NDC-based authentication, while Section 5 describes the CSP authentication property called Agreement; Section 6 shows that, under some assumptions, message authentication of the spi-calculus and NDC-based authentication are equivalent; in Section 6 we also compare Agreement with spi-authentication, showing that the former implies the latter under some reasonable assumptions; Section 7 brie y discusses some veriÿcation issues; Section 8 describes some concluding remarks and future work. Finally, an appendix contains the proofs of some results reported in the paper.
The model
In this section we describe the language we use for the speciÿcation of authentication properties and protocols, originally presented in [14] . It is called cryptographic security process algebra (CryptoSPA for short), and is a variant of value-passing CCS [23] , where the processes are provided with some primitives for manipulating messages. In particular, processes can perform message encryption and decryption, and also construct complex messages by composing together simpler ones.
The CryptoSPA syntax
The CryptoSPA syntax is based on the following elements:
• A set I = {a; b; : : :} of input channels and a set O = { a; b; : : :} of output channels, related through a function · : I ∪ O → I ∪ O which given an input a ∈ I returns the corresponding output a ∈ O and vice versa, i.e., a = a.
• A set M of basic messages. The set M of all messages is deÿned as the least set such that M ⊆ M and ∀m; m ; k ∈ M we have that (m; m ) (pairs) and {m} k (encryptions) also belong to M.
• A set C ⊆ I ∪ O of channels, ranged over by c, such that c ∈ C i c ∈ C; these channels represent the insecure network on which the enemy can intercept and fake messages. Channels in (I ∪ O)\C are the private channels.
• A function Msg : I ∪ O → P(M) which maps every channel c into the set of possible messages that can be sent and received along such a channel. Msg is such that Msg(c) = Msg( c).
• A set Act = {c(m) | c ∈ I; m ∈ Msg(c)}∪ { c m | c ∈ O; m ∈ Msg(c)} ∪ { } of actions ( is the internal, invisible action), ranged over by a; we also have a function chan(a) which returns c if a is either c(m) or cm, and the special channel void when a = ; we assume that void is never used within a restriction operator (see below).
• A set Var of variables, ranged over by x.
• A set Const of constants, ranged over by A. The syntax of CryptoSPA terms (or processes) is deÿned as follows:
| A(e 1 ; : : : ; e n ) | [e = e ]E; E | [ e 1 : : : e r rule x]E; E where e; e ; e 1 ; : : : ; e r are messages or variables, L is a set of input channels and f : Act → Act is a function that relabels channel names inside actions. 2 Both the operators c(x):E and [ e 1 : : : e r rule x]E; E bind the variable x in E. It is also assumed that each constant A has an associated deÿning equation: A(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) def = E where E is a CryptoSPA process which may contain no free variables except x 1 ; : : : ; x n , which must be distinct. Constants permit us to deÿne recursive processes.
Besides the standard value-passing CCS operators, we have an additional one that has been introduced in order to model message handling and cryptography. Informally, the [ m 1 : : : m r rule x]E 1 ; E 2 process tries to deduce a piece of information z from the tuple of messages m 1 : : : m r through one application of rule rule ; if it succeeds then it behaves like E 1 [z=x], otherwise it behaves like E 2 . See next subsection for a more detailed explanation of derivation rules.
We call E the set of all the CryptoSPA closed terms (i.e., with no free variables), and we deÿne sort(E) to be the set of all the channels syntactically occurring in the term E. Moreover, for the sake of readability, we always omit the termination 0 at the end of process speciÿcations, e.g., we write a in place of a:0. We also write [m = m ]E in place of [m = m ]E; 0 and analogously for [ m 1 : : : m r rule x]E; 0. Finally, we often replace constructive rules (encryption and pairing) with the resulting messages, e.g., we use c{m} k as a shortcut for [ m; k enc x] cx.
The operational semantics of CryptoSPA
In order to model message handling and cryptography, CryptoSPA may be equipped with a set of inference rules (inference system). Note that CryptoSPA syntax, its semantics and the results obtained herein are completely parametric with respect to the inference system used. It is thus quite easy to adopt other rules, e.g., for modeling some kinds of cryptographic weakness. For explanatory purposes, in Fig. 1 , we provide a simple inference system which is quite similar to those used by many authors (see, e.g., [17, 19] ). We consider a function · −1 : M → M which denotes, for each key k (i.e., a message possibly used as encryption key), the corresponding decryption key. Note that there are no rules, to obtain the message k −1 from k (and vice versa). In particular, the inference system can combine two messages obtaining a pair (rule pair ); it can extract one message from a pair (rules fst and snd ); it can encrypt a message m with a key k obtaining {m} k and, ÿnally, decrypt a message of the form {m} k only if it has the corresponding (inverse) key k −1 (rules enc and dec Given an inference system, we say that a message m can be deduced from a set of messages whenever there exists a tree whose nodes are messages, such that the root is m, the leaves are contained in and each message in the tree may be obtained by applying a rule instance of the inference system whose premises are the descendants of the message in the tree. We consider a function D, from ÿnite sets of messages to sets of messages, such that D( ) is the set of messages that can be deduced from . We assume that D is recursive.
Note that, in our model, we are assuming encryption as completely reliable. Thus, we do not allow any kind of cryptographic attack, e.g., the guessing of secret keys. Nevertheless, we observe the attacks that can be carried out even if cryptography is completely reliable.
The behavior of a CryptoSPA term is formally described by means of the labeled transition system E; Act; { a →} a∈Act , where a → a∈Act is the least relation between CryptoSPA terms induced by the axioms and inference rules of Fig. 2 .
Example 2.1. We present a very simple example of a protocol where A sends a message m A to B encrypted with a key k AB shared between A and B. We deÿne it as P AB = k AB (symmetric encryption) and Msg(c) = M. We want to analyze the execution of P with no intrusion, we thus consider P\{c}, since the restriction guarantees that c is now a private channel between A and B. We obtain a process whose only possible execution is the correct one where A sends to B the message {m A } kAB and then out m A is executed:
The enemy
In this section we characterize the crucial notion of enemy (or intruder) as done in [14] . Such a characterization is necessary to analyze protocols where some information is assumed to be secret, as it always happens in cryptographic protocols. Intuitively, an enemy can be thought of as a process which tries to attack a protocol by stealing and faking the information which is transmitted on the CryptoSPA public channels in set C. In principle, such a process could be modeled as a generic process X which can communicate only through the channels belonging to C. However, in this way, we obtain that X is a too powerful attacker which is able to "guess" every secret information (e.g., the private key K AB of Example 2.1), as illustrated in the following example.
Example 2.2. Consider again the protocol P of Example 2.1. Since only A and B know k AB , this protocol should guarantee the authenticity of m A even in the presence of an enemy. We assume that c ∈ C is a public channel and we consider the following process:
This process may only communicate over the public channel c, as sort(X (m; k))={c}. Consider now process X (m X ; k AB ), which knows k AB and can consequently send a faked message {m X } kAB to B. In order to observe this, we consider the following process "under attack" (note that we put X inside the scope of restriction):
(P X (m X ; k AB ))\{c}
After one communication step, the process above can perform out m X which represents the fact that B has received m X instead of m A . This happens since X (m X ; k AB ) is in some sense "guessing" k AB , but we would like to forbid such behavior since, as mentioned above, we are interested in attacks that can be carried out even when cryptography is completely reliable.
This problem of guessing secret values can be solved by imposing some constraints on the initial data known by the intruders. Given a process E, we call ID(E) the set of messages that appear in E. More formally, we deÿne ID(E) as I (E; ∅), where Fig. 3 . Informally, I (E; V ) is a function that recursively visits the sub-terms of E and the body of the constants used. The argument V is used to check that the unwinding of a constant deÿnition is performed only once. Now, let I ⊆ M be the initial knowledge that we would like to give to the intruders, i.e., the public information such as the names of the entities and the public keys, plus some possible private data of the intruders (e.g., their private key or nonces). For a certain intruder X , we want that all the messages in ID(X ) are deducible from I . We thus deÿne the set E I C of enemies as
To see how E I C prevents the problem presented in Example 2.2, consider again the enemy X (m X ; k AB ) of that example. To specify that k AB is secret, it is now su cient to require that k AB = ∈ D( I ). Since ID(X (m X ; k AB )) = {m X ; k AB }, we ÿnally have that
Semantic equivalences
In this section we deÿne some semantic equivalences that we will use to formalize security properties. Each equivalence is based on a particular notion of indistinguishable behavior which we informally describe in the following:
• Trace equivalence requires, for two processes to be equivalent, that the set of their possible execution sequences is exactly the same. This must be true even when the processes are exposed to every possible intruder. Such a deÿnition would be too strong for our purposes if used without restricting public channels: as a matter of fact, a generic intruder would be able to guess secret values hence breaking cryptography. Thus, we will always use trace equivalence inside deÿnitions that restrict the scope of public channels. Trace equivalence is used in Section 4 for the deÿnition of NDC and in Section 5 for the deÿnition of Agreement.
• May-testing equivalence requires that equivalent processes cannot be distinguished by any process (tester) that does not know the secret values. This deÿnition incorporates the fact that the tester is not able to break cryptography and is thus suitable to work on "open" processes. May-Testing is used in Section 3 for the deÿnition of spi-calculus authentication. We will also deÿne some technical notions which will be useful in proofs:
• Barbed pre-congruence relation, denoted with P -P , requires that the "greater" process P is able to simulate step-by-step the "smaller" one P, in any testing context. This notion is useful to prove that two processes are testing equivalent.
• A structural equivalence is also deÿned, in order to simplify the manipulation of parallel and restriction operators in the proofs. We now formally deÿne the notions described above.
Trace equivalence
Most of the security properties that have been proposed for the analysis of security protocols are based on the simple notion of trace: two processes are equivalent if they show exactly the same execution sequences (called traces). We need a transition relation E a ⇒ E which does not consider internal moves. It is a shorthand for
For a trace = a 1 : : : a n we write
an ⇒ E for some E 1 ; : : : ; E n−1 . Note that E ⇒ E stands for a possibly empty sequence of internal transitions, i.e., E( →) * E . The set Tr(E) of traces associated with E is then deÿned as Tr(E) = { ∈ (Act\{ })
Deÿnition 2.4. Let E; F ∈ E. We write E6 trace F i Tr(E) ⊆ Tr(F). We also say that E and F are trace equivalent (notation E ≈ trace F) i E6 trace F and F6 trace E.
Testing equivalence for CryptoSPA
In this section we give a notion of behavioral equivalence which incorporates the idea of unguessable secrets discussed in the previous section. This equivalence will allow us to rephrase in our model the notion of authentication used in the spi-calculus [1, 2] . The underlying idea is that two processes are equivalent if and only if they cannot be distinguished by any process that does not know the secret values. It is a weaker version of classical testing equivalence, which requires that equivalent processes should be indistinguishable by any process [5] .
We deÿne the notion of experiment as given in the spi-calculus. A test is a pair (T; ÿ), where T is a process called tester and ÿ is a barb, i.e., a channel c or c. A process P exhibits a barb ÿ (denoted by P ↓ ÿ) i for some message m and process P , we have P ÿm −→ P . Moreover P converges on a barb ÿ (denoted by P ⇓ ÿ) i P( →) * P and P ↓ ÿ. Now, we say that a process P immediately passes a test (T; ÿ) i (P T ) ↓ ÿ. We also say that a process P passes a test (T; ÿ) i (P T ) ⇓ ÿ.
We parameterize the notion of equivalence by the set of messages I which are supposed to be known by the testers. Thus, we obtain the following set of possible testers: E I = {X | X ∈ E and ID(X ) ⊆ D( I )}. Note that this set is strictly larger than the set of enemies E I C deÿned in the previous section. The reason is that such enemies can only communicate over the public channels in C. Deÿnition 2.5. For all P; Q ∈ E, we write P6 may Q i ∀T ∈ E I ; ∀ÿ ∈ I ∪ O : P T ⇓ ÿ implies Q T ⇓ ÿ. We also say that P is may-testing equivalent to Q (notation P ≈ may Q) i P6 may Q and Q6 may P.
It is easy to prove that ≈ may is an equivalence relation on CryptSPA processes. Testing equivalence has been exploited in a very elegant way for the formal analysis of security protocols in the spi-calculus, as it implicitly provides a check over every possible enemy. In fact, a tester can play at the same time the role of the attacker and the role of the observer that checks the outcomes of this attack. Thus, if two processes are may-testing equivalent, this means that they behave in the same way also when they are executed together with every possible enemy.
Our notion of may-testing equivalence di ers from the deÿnition given for the spi-calculus, where every possible spi-calculus process can be a test. This di erence is due to the way secret messages are dealt with. The restriction operator of the (s)pi-calculus supports the speciÿcation of new, and thus unguessable, messages directly inside a process. In this way, a special quantiÿcation over a subset of testers (with knowledge limited by I ) is not needed, and a classic testing-equivalence su ces. 3 Proposition 2.6. Let P; Q ∈ E. Then, P6 trace Q implies P6 may Q.
This derives from the standard result that classical may-testing preorder (with the quantiÿcation over any possible test) corresponds to trace preorder. It is interesting to observe that the opposite implication does not hold. As a counterexample consider a process A( 
We can also prove that our may-testing preorder is preserved by the parallel composition with testers and by the restriction operator.
Proposition 2.7. Let P; Q ∈ E be two processes, R ∈ E I a tester and L a set of channels. If P6 may Q then (i) P R6 may Q R; (ii) P\L6 may Q\L.
Corollary 2.8. Let P; Q ∈ E. If P ≈ may Q then for all R ∈ E I we have P R ≈ may Q R and P\L ≈ may Q\L.
We will exploit these results when comparing the two di erent notions of authentication we are going to introduce in the following sections.
Barbed bisimulation
Barbed bisimulation [25] provides very e cient proof techniques for verifying the other equivalence notions deÿned so far.
A barbed bisimulation is a symmetric relation S such that both S and S −1 are barbed simulations. The union of all barbed simulations is represented by E. Deÿnition 2.10. A relation S ⊆ E × E is a barbed pre-congruence (w.r.t. I ) i for (P; Q) ∈ S and for all R ∈ E I we have P R E Q R.
We deÿne -to be the largest barbed pre-congruence. As usual we can deÿne the notion of barbed equivalence, and the weak versions of these preorders and equivalences. In particular, a barbed weak simulation (denoted with C = ) is a relation deÿned as in Deÿnition 2.9 by simply replacing Q ↓ ÿ with Q ⇓ ÿ and Q → Q with Q( →) * Q . A barbed weak pre-congruence (denoted with /) is deÿned as in Deÿnition 2.10 by replacing E with C = .
The following result is useful to prove that two processes are related by 6 may .
Proposition 2.11. -; / ⊆6 may .
We also deÿne structural equivalence as follows.
Deÿnition 2.12. Let P; Q; R ∈ E and L; L 1 ⊆ I . Then, we deÿne ≡ as the least equivalence relation closed under the following rules:
Structural equivalence will be useful to manipulate parallel and restriction operators in the proofs. Moreover, the following lemma shows that structural equivalence is a barbed simulation; hence, in the following, it will be sound to use barbed simulation up to "equivalent processes" as a proof technique.
where P ≡ S ≡ Q means that for some P ≡ P and Q ≡ Q we have (P ; Q ) ∈ S. Proposition 2.15. If S is a barbed simulation up to ≡ then ≡ S ≡ is a barbed simulation.
An analogous deÿnition and result can be given for barbed weak simulation up to ≡.
Message authentication in the spi-calculus
In [1, 2] an interesting notion of authentication is proposed. Consider a process S(m) representing a protocol 4 which has the aim of transmitting message m from a party A to a party B. S(m) guarantees the authentication of message m if whenever a message m is delivered to B by S(m), then m must be the same message as m.
The basic idea behind the veriÿcation of this property is the following: we have to generate from S(m) a speciÿcation S spec (m) which guarantees authentication by construction, i.e., where the only message that can be delivered to B is m. Then, we can verify whether S(m) is may-testing equivalent to the speciÿcation S spec (m), i.e., whether there exists or not an attacker which can induce S(m) to behave wrongly with respect to the delivery of m.
In [1, 2] a general method for generating the speciÿcation S spec (m) is not provided. Instead, the construction of S spec (m) is illustrated by several example protocols. Intuitively, it can be obtained as follows: in the protocol S(m), every time B accepts a message m, such a message is replaced by m. In the following we formalize this intuition obtaining a general method for the construction of S spec (m) starting from S(m). We feel that our formalization is general enough to model the signiÿcant examples of cryptographic protocols reported in [1, 2] (see also Section 6.1.1). Note 1. As in [1, 2] , we assume that S(m) is always composed of two parts: one strictly concerning the protocol execution and another one representing the continuation of the protocol. The latter is usually denoted by F(x), where x represents the received message. Here, we assume that the execution part can only send messages on public channels c ∈ C, while the continuation, by deÿnition, does not take part to the protocol, and so it must use channels which are not in C.
When may-testing equivalence is checked, the tester ideally acts as an attacker on the public channels and as an observer on the continuations. We give a simple example of a protocol speciÿcation in this style.
Example 3.1. We specify here a trivial protocol where Alice sends to Bob a message m as plain text over an insecure channel c:
When Bob receives the message in y, he just behaves like F(y) which will possibly use the message in the future. The corresponding secure speciÿcation is
where it is possible to give to Bob a message t that is "magically" checked against y before activating the continuation F. In S spec (m) we have that Bob can only accept the correct message m, then behaving like F(m). This represents the secure version of S(m), i.e., a version where the received message is always authentic by construction. Clearly, S(m) does not guarantee any authentication of m: any external user can introduce a fake message m on c that will be accepted by Bob. As a consequence, S(m) can move to F(m ) while S spec (m) cannot.
Note that we can rewrite this protocol in a style that separates more evidently the execution part from the continuation one:
As a matter of fact, A (x) B represents the execution, while p(z):F(z) is the continuation with a "guard" p(z) which has the special purpose of enabling the execution of F(z) at the right time. It is possible to show that this special form S (x) for the protocol is trace and may-testing equivalent to the initial one S(x), provided that p = ∈ sort(F).
As we have seen in the example above, it can be useful to write a protocol in a particular style that we call normal form. In general, more than one continuation could be present. Given a protocol S, we denote all of its occurrences of continuations 5 as {F 1 (x 1 ); : : : ; F n (x n )}, where x i represents the only free variable of F i . From S we derive a process S nf (m 1 ; : : : ; m n ) in normal form as follows:
where S is the process S where every continuation F i (x i ) is replaced by p Fi (x i ), and p = {p F1 ; : : : ; p Fn } is a set of channels that are used neither in S nor in F i and are not contained in C. Note that the channels inp are indexed with the continuations F i . This is useful for managing multiple concurrent sessions between senders and receivers which can be modeled by considering n copies of the sender and n copies of the receiver in parallel. We assume that syntactically equal continuations (up to renaming of bound variables, i.e., -conversion) correspond to the same protocol between two users but in di erent parallel sessions. Given this particular form for protocols, it is quite natural to derive a secure speciÿ-cation. More precisely, given the normal form S nf (m 1 ; : : : ; m n ) as in (1), it is su cient to deÿne S spec (m 1 ; : : : ; m n ) as follows:
Note that every continuation is enabled only if the received message x i is equal to the correct message m i . Note also that in the case of multiple sessions, this simply requires that a "correct" multiset of messages is delivered from one process to another one, in whatever possible order (see Section 6.1.1 for an example).
Remark 3.2. In the following, we will always consider protocols in the normal form (1) and speciÿcations in the form (2).
As done in the spi-calculus, we will always assume that the messages m i to be delivered by the protocol are not secret, otherwise it would not be possible to observe them with testing equivalence. Assumption 1. When we consider a message m to be delivered by a protocol we always assume that m ∈ D( I ).
Another important assumption (common to the spi-calculus approach) about the continuations is that they should not know the protocol secrets. Otherwise, they could help the tester attacking the protocol by making such secrets public.
Assumption 2. For all continuations F(x) and for all
Hence, we can formalize in our framework the notion of authentication proposed for the spi-calculus. The following lemma states that the behavior of a speciÿcation may always be simulated by the protocol. So, as expected, the speciÿcation only shows a (correct) subset of the possible behaviors of the protocol.
Lemma 3.4. For all vector of messagesm = (m i ) i∈1:::n ; S spec (m) -S(m).
As a consequence, we have that spi-authentication concerns whether the speciÿcation is an upper bound of the protocol. In [1] , another notion of authentication is proposed which includes a quantiÿcation over the continuations F i . In this way, it is possible to study if the protocol guarantees authentication in every possible context, rather than just in a special situation characterized by a speciÿc continuation. To clarify this point we give the following simple example.
Example 3.6. Consider again the simple protocol of Example 3.1. Now, consider the special case where F(x) = 0. We obtain that for every m; S(m) is equivalent to S spec (m). Indeed, S(m) and S spec (m) become the same process if F(x) = 0. However, we have already observed that this trivial protocol cannot guarantee the authenticity of m. On the contrary, if we replace F(x) with out x then we may detect the attack. The continuations play thus a central role. In particular, if the behavior of a continuation does not depend on the message x then it cannot help detecting authentication attacks.
LetF be a vector of continuations (F 1 ; : : : ; F n ). We will denote with SF the protocol S where its continuations are replaced byF. Moreover, the initial vector of a protocol S will be denoted byF * . When we quantify over all possible vectors of continuations, we require that equal continuations (up to -conversion) are always replaced by equal continuations. More formally, we say that two vectors (F 1 ; : : : F n ); (F 1 ; : : : ; F n ) are compatible if and only if ∀i; j ∈ {1; : : : n}: F i = F j i F i = F j . We then consider only the vectors of continuations that are compatible with the initial oneF * . This condition is necessary if we want to analyze multiple sessions where many instances (all with the same continuation) of a process are considered (see Section 6.1.1). Hence, we obtain the following more general deÿnition: Deÿnition 3.7. A protocol S guarantees (strong) spi-authentication i for all the vectors of continuationsF compatible withF * ; SF guarantees weak spi-authentication.
In the following, with spi-authentication we will always refer to the strong spiauthentication property.
Example 3.8. In order to illustrate the deÿnition above, we consider once more the simple insecure protocol of Example 3.1. We have already shown that it does not guarantee any authentication of m. Here we formally prove that it does not guarantee spi-authentication.
To this purpose, it is enough to consider the continuationF = (out z), the messagẽ m = (m) and the tester (T; ÿ) with T = c m :out(x):[x = m ] ÿ x and m = m. Now it is easy to see that SF (m) ≈ may SF spec (m). As a matter of fact,
On the other hand, whatever execution sequence is performed by process SF spec (m) T , the only out y action that can be executed by SF spec (m) is out m. So T will always receive m which is di erent from m and the test [x = m ] will never be passed. So, SF spec (m) T ⇓ ÿ
In the following, we will show that there exists a vector of canonical continuationsF such that the weak spi-authentication of SF implies the spi-authentication of S. Thus, these special continuations allow us to avoid the universal quantiÿcation over all possible vectorsF. In particular, we consider the special vectorF where F i (x i ) = out F * i (x i ) and such that the channels out F * i are private, i.e., not in C. Note that this vector is compatible withF * . We have the following result.
Proposition 3.9. S guarantees spi-authentication i SF guarantees weak spi-authentication, with
Intuitively, this interesting result states that there exists a canonical continuationF that can be considered in order to prove spi-authentication for every possible continuation. We will use this result to compare such a notion of authentication with the NDC-based one (see Section 6.1).
The solution of using may-testing equivalence for authentication veriÿcation is very elegant, but mixing the tester and the intruder could generate some confusion. It would be much more intuitive to separate the intrusion activity from the equivalence check. This is what is done in the property we are going to present in the next section. Moreover, here the deÿnition of the speciÿcation is somewhat arbitrary and is related to the particular form of the protocols. In the next section we will show that the deÿnition of a secure speciÿcation is not necessary anymore when we adopt a notion of authentication based on non-interference.
NDC-based authentication
We recall the notion of non-interference (NI) [15] . NI was proposed in system security as a model for the detection of all possible interferences of a certain group of users with another one. It has been formalized in di erent ways (see, e.g., [9, 15, 24, 28] ), and also applied in the veriÿcation of various properties of security protocols [6] [7] [8] , with authentication among them. The correctness of a protocol can be proved by guaranteeing that an enemy is not able to interfere at all with the execution of the protocol, i.e., that the protocol behaves exactly in the same way with or without the enemy. In this respect, we have already noticed a similarity in the two approaches.
In the following, we will use the generalization of NI to the process algebraic setting proposed in [9] and called non-deducibility on compositions (NDC). The idea is the following: the group U of untrusted users that must not interfere with the other users (in trusted group T) is characterized by the set of actions that its components can execute. Public channels in C are the channels which processes in U can use for communication. A process S is NDC if every possible process X ∈ U composed with S is not able to modify the behavior of S observed from the point of view of the users in T. Thus, U corresponds to E I C and NDC can be deÿned as follows, where we always consider processes S which are in (normal) form (1).
The only di erence with respect to the deÿnition given in the original model (SPA, with no cryptography) is that the knowledge of processes X ∈ U is bounded by I . In CryptoSPA, this is required to correctly model secret values, as observed in Section 2.3. NDC requires that untrusted processes in E I C are not able to change the behavior of the process observed from processes in T and represented by S\C. As a matter of fact, S\C is the process where no untrusted activity is allowed. If it is equivalent to (S X )\C, this means that X is not able to modify in any observable way the execution of S.
Note that NDC, in its original deÿnition, is based on trace equivalence. Here we give a deÿnition of may-testing-based NDC (TNDC) in order to compare it with the authentication notion deÿned in the previous section.
An intuitive notion of authentication can be given in a natural way through TNDC= NDC as follows: Note that in the deÿnition above we do not take care of continuations. In particular, the fact that S(m 1 ; : : : ; m n ) ∈ (T )NDC requires that S(m 1 ; : : : ; m n ) composed with whatever enemy X ∈ E I C is equivalent to S(m 1 ; : : : ; m n )\C. Since C represents the set of channels over which the parties communicate, then S(m 1 ; : : : ; m n )\C corresponds to a secure speciÿcation (execution with protected channels). In this approach we obtain, in a sense, the secure speciÿcation for free.
Example 4.4.
Similarly to what we did in Example 3.8, we apply the NDC deÿnition above to formally prove that the protocol of Example 3.1 is insecure, with respect to authentication of m.
It is interesting to see that since we restrict the behavior of the process on the channels in C we actually do not observe directly the communication, but only the behavior on the continuations. We obtain a speciÿcation that is somehow simpler than the one needed in the spi-calculus authentication approach. As a matter of fact, S(m)\C is trace and may-testing equivalent to the process F(m), which is just the expected (correct) continuation for the protocol.
Proving that the protocol is not NDC is rather simple. Consider a message m and an attacker X = c m with m = m. Now it is easy to see that (S(m) X )\C ≈ trace S(m)\C when F(m ) trace F(m). As a matter of fact, it quite easy to prove that (S(m) X )\C ≈ trace F(m) + F(m ) trace F(m) ≈ trace S(m)\C when F(m ) trace F(m). The last condition is rather intuitive and can be read as "the fact that Bob receives a message di erent from the expected one has some observable e ect on his future behavior". If this is not true, the value of the received message is not relevant and checking the authentication of m becomes useless.
The agreement property
In this section we recall the notion of Agreement [18] as formalized in the general schema of [14] .
Technically, what is done in the Agreement property is to have for each party an action representing the running of the protocol and another one representing the completion of it. For example, consider an action commit res(B; A; ds) representing a correct termination of B as a responder that is convinced to communicate with A and agrees on data in ds. Moreover, consider an action running ini(A; B; ds) that represents the fact that A is running the protocol as an initiator, apparently with B and with data ds. If we have these two actions speciÿed in the protocol, the Agreement property requires that when B executes commit res(B; A; ds), then A has previously executed running ini(A; B; ds). This means that every time B completes the protocol with A convinced that the relevant data are the ones represented by ds, then A must have been running the protocol with B using exactly the data in ds.
As done in [18] , we assume that the actions representing the running and the commit are correctly speciÿed in the protocol. We can see them as output actions over two particular channels running ini and commit res. For simplicity, in the examples we only analyze the case where A is the initiator and B is the responder, and the set ds of data items is composed only by a single datum d from a set D. However, the speciÿcation can be easily extended in order to cover all the cases studied in [18] . Let NotObs(P) = sort(P)\(C ∪ {running ini; commit res}) be the set of channels in P that are not public and are di erent from running ini and commit res, i.e., that will not be observed. We can then deÿne function Agree as follows: c m:P Agree (P) = P P (A; B) Note that P is essentially the process that executes every possible action over channels in sort(P) which are not in C and are di erent from running ini and commit res. Given P; Agree (P) represents the most general process that satisÿes the Agreement property and has the same sort as P. As a matter of fact in Agree (P) action running ini (A; B; d) always precedes commit res (B; A; d) for every datum d, and every combination of the other actions of P can be executed. In order to analyze more than one session, it is su cient to consider an extended which has several processes P (A; B) in parallel. For example, for n sessions we can consider the following:
We want that even in the presence of an enemy, P does not execute traces that are not in Agree (P). So we can give the following deÿnition:
Deÿnition 5.1. P ∈ E satisÿes Agreement i ∀X ∈ E I C : (P X )\C6 trace Agree (P)
Note that in [18] it is only required that Agreement holds when the process is composed with a particular intruder, which should intuitively be the most powerful one. In [14] we have formally proved that this simpler requirement is su cient (and necessary) to guarantee our version of Agreement. This point is discussed further in Section 7.
Example 5.2. We consider here a simple example to illustrate the Agreement property. One of the aim of Agreement is to verify whether a protocol guarantees entity authentication of one party with respect to another one. As an example, consider the following ( awed) protocol: Alice wants to authenticate herself to a server S; in order to achieve this, she sends her login "A" and password "wonderland", both encrypted with a key which is shared with the server S. The encryption should avoid the discovering of Alice's password by a malicious third party.
We specify this protocol as follows (we directly enrich the protocol with running ini and commit res actions): ∈ I , as they are secret. We suppose to have more than one server ready to verify authentication requests from the users. An important property that this protocol should guarantee is that no malicious party should be able to impersonate any users with respect to the server S. We now show that this protocol is insecure by proving that it does not satisfy Agreement. In particular, it is su cient to consider the following attacker (belonging to E I C ) which intercepts the message from Alice and replays it later: X = c(x): cx: cx. Now it is easy to see that (P X )\C trace Agree (P) by considering the following execution: where a commit with no previous running is present and which, consequently, is not a trace for Agree (P). The enemy is able to impersonate Alice by just replaying the same encrypted message. Note that the enemy is not learning the password as he does not know that key K AS . Nevertheless, he is able to carry out the attack.
Comparison
In this section, we formally compare the notions of authentication presented in the previous sections. Speciÿcally, we compare the notion of authentication proposed for the spi-calculus both with the TNDC-based authentication and with the Agreement one.
Spi-calculus and NDC-based authentication
We have already pointed out some of the similarities between spi-calculus and NDCbased authentication: both properties are based on a notion of behavioral equivalence; moreover, they both check whether the "process under attack" behaves like a secure speciÿcation. It is, however, important to notice that this is done in a quite di erent way. In the spi-calculus the process is implicitly checked against all the possible interactions with the (hostile) environment through the use of the may-testing equivalence. There, the tester plays simultaneously both the role of the attacker and the role of the observer (see Fig. 4 ). On the other hand, the TNDC-based approach performs an explicit quantiÿcation over all possible intruders, then observing the outcome of the attack (see Fig. 5 ). The ÿrst interesting result shows that authentication in the spicalculus is at least as discriminating as the TNDC-based one, when S spec guarantees TNDC-authentication. (Later on, we will prove that also the converse holds, under some mild assumptions.) Proposition 6.1. Let S be a protocol and S spec be a secure speciÿcation ( for S) that guarantees TNDC-authentication. If S guarantees spi-authentication then S guarantees TNDC-authentication.
Proof. We have to prove that
for all vectors of messagesm. Since S(m) ≈ may S spec (m) and ≈ may is a congruence w.r.t. the restriction operator and the parallel composition with processes in E I (see Corollary 2.8), then proving (3) is equivalent to proving the following:
which is true by the hypothesis S spec (m) ∈ TNDC.
One of the hypotheses of the proposition above is that S spec guarantees TNDCauthentication. As a matter of fact, we can prove that any speciÿcation S spec guarantees TNDC-authentication, under the following well-formedness condition:
WFC1 For every vector of messagesm; S spec (m)\C ≈ may
This condition is a very natural one as it requires that all the continuations of the speciÿcations when there is no attacker at all, are eventually enabled. In other words, the speciÿcation is well formed for not containing unreachable continuations. If it does, then some useless redundancy is present in S spec . Under this condition we can prove the following lemma. Lemma 6.2. Assume that for every vector of messagesm; S spec (m)\C ≈ may k∈1::n F k (m k ). Then, S spec guarantees TNDC-authentication.
This lemma gives a formal evidence of the correctness of the way we deÿne speciÿcations S spec . As a consequence of this lemma we obtain that, in general, spiauthentication is at least as discriminating as the TNDC-based one. Corollary 6.3. Let S be a protocol such that for everym; S spec (m)\C ≈ may k∈1::n F k (m k ). If S guarantees spi-authentication then S guarantees TNDC-authentication.
Proof. The proof directly follows from Proposition 6.1 and Lemma 6.2.
The other implication is less obvious. As a matter of fact, since in TNDC the action of the intruder is separated from the observation activity (see also Fig. 5) , we have to be sure that this "splitting" can be performed without loosing discriminating power. For example, as our intruders are not able to communicate over the channels of the continuations, one may think, at a ÿrst glance, that TNDC may miss some possible attack. We show that this is not the case.
We need to precisely deÿne when the delivering of a set of messages to the continuations is correct in a protocol. Intuitively, it is correct if the same delivering is possible also in the speciÿcation. To formalize this concept we need to deÿne the vectors of activations. Deÿnition 6.4. Let SF (m) be a protocol and T be a tester and consider a computation between them. The vector of activations of (denoted with Activations( )) is the vector of all the activated continuations with the received message:
where the ordering of the activations is the same as in , and synchronizes means that p Fi (x i ):F i (x i ) and p F k m raise an internal communication.
In order to deÿne when a vector of activations is correct for a process S with continuationsF = (F i ) i∈1:::n and messagesm = (m i ) i∈1:::n we consider, as a reference, the following vector A which is correct by construction:
All the "correct" vectors of activations correspond to all the permutations of sub-vectors of A. We deÿne now the notion of correct delivering schema, which relates the activations of a computation to correct vectors. By the fact that Avs i = A Â(i) and that Â is injective, it is easy to see that a correct delivering schema of Activation( ) has the following relevant properties:
• is injective;
• for all p F k m synchronized in we have m (k) = m and F k = F (k) . Intuitively, this means that if a protocol activates a continuation through p F k m , then is the function that returns the index (k) of a correct delivering F (k) (m (k) ) = F k (m ), i.e., a delivering which can be executed by the secure speciÿcation. Moreover, each activation is mapped by into a di erent correct delivering.
The following lemma states that if a protocol executes a computation where only correct activations are performed, then also the secure speciÿcation can execute .
Lemma 6.7. Let SF (m) be a protocol and T be a tester. Suppose SF (m) T ⇓ ÿ through a computation such that Activations( ) is a correct vector of activations. Then, SF spec (m) T ⇓ ÿ.
As a direct consequence of the above lemma, we have that if SF (m) T ⇓ ÿ and SF spec (m) T ⇓ ÿ, then, for all the successful computations of SF (m) T (i.e., for all the computations where SF (m) T ( →) * SF (m) T ↓ ÿ), we have that Activations( ) is not a correct vector of activations. This means that in every that leads T to success, we always have at least one message delivering which cannot be simulated by SF spec (m).
To prove the following result we need this additional well-formedness condition:
(WFC2) For every vector of messagesm; S(m)\C ≈ may S spec (m)\C.
The condition above is an obvious requisite for S spec : the process S and its speciÿcation S spec behave in the same way when the public channels are protected through the restriction (i.e., when no attack is possible).
Lemma 6.8. Let S be a protocol such that for every vector of messagesm; S(m)\C ≈ may S spec (m)\C. If S F guarantees TNDC-authentication then S F guarantees weak spi-authentication.
From the previous results the following can be easily proved. Proof. One direction follows from Corollary 6.3. By the other hand, if the process SF is authentic w.r.t. the TNDC based deÿnition then by Lemma 6.8 we discover that SF is (weak) spi-authentic and ÿnally by Proposition 3.9 we ÿnd out that S guarantees (strong) spi-authentication. Now we show that the two notions of message authentication based on non-interference, i.e. TNDC and NDC, actually coincide when we study canonical forms. This is very useful to avoid the implicit quantiÿcation in TNDC due to testing equivalence. We give the following proposition which can be applied when a CryptoSPA process P is the product of the canonical continuationsF in order to obtain the ÿnal result (see Theorem 6.11).
Proposition 6.10. Let P be a CryptoSPA process which can only execute a ÿnite number of output actions and such that ID(P) ⊆ D( I ). Then, for all Q ∈ E; P ≈ may Q i P ≈ trace Q.
Finally, the following result completes the comparison. Theorem 6.11. Let S be a protocol which guarantees the well-formedness conditions (WFC1) and (WFC2). Then, S guarantees (strong) spi-authentication if and only if SF eiguarantees NDC-authentication.
Proof. By Theorem 6.9, we need only to prove that SF (m) ∈ TNDC i SF (m) ∈ NDC. On the one hand, the fact that SF (m) ∈ NDC implies SF (m) ∈ TNDC, follows from Proposition 2.6.
For the other direction, we have that Hence, the thesis follows.
An example: the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol
In this section we show how to use NDC to analyze a simpliÿed version (also studied in [2] ) of the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol [4] .
We consider two processes A and B, respectively, sharing keys k AS and k BS with a trusted server S. In order to establish a secure channel with B; A sends a fresh key k AB encrypted with k AS to the server S. Then, the server decrypts the key and forwards it to B, this time encrypted with k BS . Now B has the key k AB and A can send a message m A encrypted with k AB to B. The protocol should guarantee that when B receives m A , such a message has been indeed originated by A. The protocol is composed of the following three messages (see also Fig. 6 ):
The main di erence with respect to the original protocol is that here messages 1 and 2 do not contain timestamps. This makes the protocol sensitive to a replay attack (as already remarked in [1] ). We specify the protocol as the following CryptoSPA normal form: The enemy X intercepts messages 2 and 3 and replays them, inducing B to commit twice on message m (as shown by trace out F m:out F m). This attack is quite critical in some situations. As an example, m could be a request of money transfer that would be executed twice. In order to avoid this attack, it is possible to modify the protocol (as done in [2] ) by adding nonce-based challenge responses.
Agreement and spi-authentication
In this section, we compare the Agreement property and the spi-authentication one. We show that, in a particular (but reasonable) situation, Agreement implies spi-authentication. The intuition is that Agreement provides a form of authentication of the origin of a message, while the spi-authentication notion is more concerned with the integrity of the message itself.
First of all, we must choose a common setting for the comparison. We keep the same assumption we made for the previous comparison. Hence, we suppose that our processes are in the normal form (1) and satisfy the Assumptions 1 and 2, required by our previous analysis.
We are studying protocols which typically must deliver information (messages) among parties. In the Agreement property the roles of the sender (the initiator) and the receiver (the responder) are made explicit by using control actions. In the spiauthentication approach these roles are in a sense implicit. As a matter of fact, we can think of the processes with the continuations as the receivers, and of the other ones as the senders.
Typically, in the automated analysis of security protocols, ÿxed instances of sessions are considered, where speciÿc messages are sent. We thus focus our comparison on this restricted framework and we consider a simple situation where a process is willing to independently receive n messages from several users. Thus, we assume to have n (not necessarily distinct) senders. We can describe this process in the following way:
where B n is the parallel composition of n copies of B in which the abstraction F(y) is substituted by p F (y).
For the analysis of the Agreement property we need to consider a slightly modiÿed process, where control actions are inserted: It is possible to prove that, in the situation we are considering, the Agreement property is strictly stronger than spi-authentication. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that spi-authentication records which messages are sent to the continuations, not their originators. In order to prove this result, we exploit the characterization of spi-authentication through non-interference described earlier. We show now an interesting case of a process satisfying spi-authentication (once messages are ÿxed) but not Agreement. In particular, consider again the speciÿcation of the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol of Section 6.1.1 and ÿx the pair of messages to (m; m):
Then, clearly spi-authentication is not able to detect the replay attack shown before, as the two messages are identical and the trace where m is delivered twice is just a legal trace. On the other hand, the Agreement property is not satisÿed by this speciÿcation. In fact, the replay attack may be successfully completed even without the starting of the second run of the protocol, i.e. simply by emitting a single running ini(A; B; m). Thus, producing a trace that is not possible for the speciÿcation Agree (S ).
This gives an idea of the fact that spi-authentication, di erently from Agreement, is not related to the actual originators of the messages. However, we should remark that when the quantiÿcation is performed over every vector of messages then the previous process satisÿes neither NDC nor spi-authentication. Simply, we can consider a pair (m; m ) where m = m . This example shows that the quantiÿcation over all messages plays a central role in spi-authentication. Example 6.13. In the following, we present two protocols which enjoy spi-authentication but not Agreement, thus proving that Agreement is strictly stronger than spiauthentication.
The ÿrst example is very simple. Alice sends to Bob a message x that Bob already knows. When Bob receives a message, he just compare it with x and proceeds only if they are equal:
Note that the only syntactic di erence between S and S spec is that B(x) = c(y):[x = y] F(y) and B spec (x) = c(y):
Thus, for every m we have B(m) ≈ may B spec (m) and so S(m) ≈ may S spec (m), i.e., S satisÿes spi-authentication. Now, we reÿne S(x) to perform the Agreement analysis as follows:
A ( Alice authenticates the message x to Bob by sending it with her password pwd. Bob knows Alice's password, and, after verifying that the received message is equal to m, he checks whether the received password corresponds to pwd or not. (Bob could be a server whose unique client is Alice, and m would be the login name of Alice.)
Suppose the intruder has intercepted Alice's password in a previous session and so assume pwd ∈ D( I ). As Bob always checks the received message against the expected one m, it is impossible for an intruder to force him into accepting a faked message. With a reasoning similar to that in the previous example then we can show that S satisÿes spi-authentication. Now, we reÿne S(x) to perform the Agreement analysis as follows: Consider an intruder who knows the message m, e.g. X = c(m; pwd) (recall that pwd ∈ D( I )), then process (S (m) X )\C performs a trace where commit res(B; A; m) is not preceded by running ini(A; B; m). Again, this process does not satisfy Agreement, but it satisÿes spi-authentication. The two examples above, which discriminate between Agreement and spi-authentication, are somehow pathological as the receiver already knows the message to be received. Nevertheless, these examples clearly show a basic di erence between the two properties. On the one hand, spi-authentication focuses only on verifying that no modiÿed messages are accepted by the responder thus providing message authenticity= integrity. Here the intruder is sending the correct (expected) message, thus it does not represent an attack for spi-authentication. On the other hand, Agreement also veriÿes if the party on the other side of the network is the correct one, thus guaranteeing entity authentication. In Fig. 7 we summarize the relationships among the properties studied in this paper (where the subscript F means that the property is checked for the process with the canonical continuation).
Example 6.14. In this example we show a direct application of the comparison results above. Consider again the speciÿcation of the Wide Mouthed Frog Protocol of Section 6.1.1. We could be interested to study if it satisÿes the Agreement property. It is in the form (4). So if we consider the modiÿed protocol P (m; m ) where run and commit actions are added, we have that if P (m; m ) satisÿes Agreement then P(m; m ) satisÿes spi-authentication. Now, since we have shown that P(m; m ) does not satisfy spi-authentication then we can directly conclude that the corresponding P (m; m ) does not satisfy Agreement. Following the proof of Theorem 6.12 we can also see that the attack on spi-authentication induces an attack on Agreement where the intruder is impersonating one of the two A processes.
Veriÿcation of authentication: the "most powerful enemy"
A common feature of the properties presented so far (including also spi-authentication) is that the veriÿcation has to be carried out against all the possible enemies= testers. One of the advantages of NDC is that it is possible to prove that a "most powerful enemy" exists. Thus, such properties may be veriÿed just against such a particular hostile process.
In this section we brie y report the fundamental results about this "most powerful enemy" theory, without proving them. The interested reader may refer to [7, 13, 14] .
A "most powerful enemy" can be deÿned by using a family of processes Top From the results in [13, 14] we obtain the following: Proposition 7.1. Let S be a protocol. We have that (i) S ∈ NDC i (S Top 
Conclusion and future work
In order to compare various formalizations of security properties, we have deÿned in [13, 12, 14] a general scheme that allows us to capture a number of properties (e.g., authentication, secrecy, non-repudiation, and so on) as particular instances of the scheme itself. The results presented here are a ÿrst step towards our goal of formal comparison of security properties. Our aim is to obtain a complete classiÿcation in the style of [9, 18] , which could help in evaluating the relative merits of all such properties.
In this paper, we have compared under some reasonable assumptions three notions of authentication: spi-authentication, based on testing-equivalence, Agreement, based on the observation of correspondence actions, and NDC-authentication, based on noninterference. We have proved that the notion of spi-authentication may be equivalently expressed through the notion of NDC-authentication. Moreover, we have shown that the Agreement notion is at least as discriminating as the spi-authentication one. We have also identiÿed some (very particular) cases in which spi-authentication is strictly weaker than Agreement. Roughly speaking, spi-authentication seems to be mostly concerned with the integrity of the data transmitted whereas Agreement has a stronger commitment on the authentication of the sender. We claim that for "relevant" protocols the two properties could collapse and we leave as future work the formal characterization of such protocols.
A main goal of our current research is to provide general, e ective analysis techniques that can be suitably applied to a set of security properties. In this paper, we have seen that the spi-authentication corresponds to a notion of authentication based on NDC. This allows us, in principle, the reuse of automatic checking techniques for NDC in order to check spi-authentication over CryptoSPA protocols; indeed, as explained in [13, 12, 14] and brie y reported in Section 7, if I is ÿnite, then it is possible to ÿnd a most-general intruder Top such that NDC is reduced to just one check (SF (m 1 ; : : : ; m n ) Top)\C ≈ trace SF (m 1 ; : : : ; m n )\C that can be veriÿed using the CoSeC=CVS technology [6, 7] . We are also investigating the problem of ÿnding a ÿ-nite set of vectors of messages, which could avoid the universal quantiÿcation over all the possible messagesm. Moreover, it would be interesting to study general proof techniques for the analysis of unbounded processes and compare them with the ones proposed for authentication in the spi-calculus model (see, e.g., the proof of correctness of the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol in [1] ).
Finally, we are currently studying the relations between spi and NDC authentication also in the spi-calculus model, where the possibility of communicating channel names between processes gives rise to new interesting issues. These complicate a lot the comparison, but we feel that at least some of the results presented here hold in this model as well.
Appendix Proof
Proof. (i) We have to prove that for every barb ÿ and for every process T ∈ E I , (P R) T ⇓ ÿ implies that (Q R) T ⇓ ÿ. Now, if (P R) T ⇓ ÿ then we have (P R)
T ⇒(P R ) T and also (P R ) T ↓ ÿ. But due the operational semantics of CryptoSPA, P (R T ) ⇒ P (R T ) and P (R T ) ↓ ÿ. This means that P passes the test (R T; ÿ). Note that this is a correct test since R ∈ E I and so also R T ∈ E I . Since P6 may Q, we have that also Q passes (R T; ÿ) and hence the thesis follows.
(ii) We have to prove that for every barb ÿ and for every process T ∈ E I ; (P\L) T ⇓ ÿ implies that (Q\L) T ⇓ ÿ. If ÿ ∈ L then ÿ is executed by T and we just consider a test T where ÿ is relabeled to ÿ = ∈ L ∪ sort(P) ∪ sort(Q) ∪ sort(T ). Otherwise let ÿ be the same as ÿ. Now we clearly have that (P\L) T ⇓ ÿ . Moreover, since (P\L) cannot synchronize over channels in L then also (P\L) (T \L) ⇓ ÿ . Now, this clearly implies that also P (T \L) ⇓ ÿ and by hypothesis Q (T \L) ⇓ ÿ . Since the test (T \L) does not synchronize over channels in L we also have that (Q\L) (T \L) ⇓ ÿ and clearly (Q\L) T ⇓ ÿ . It is easy to see that also (Q\L) T ⇓ ÿ.
Proof. As usual we have that -⊆ /. Hence, we will prove that / ⊆6 may . Suppose that P / Q, and that P passes a test (T; ÿ), with T ∈ E I . This means that P T ⇒ P T and P T ↓ ÿ. Since, P / Q we get that there exists Q T such that Q T ⇒ Q T and P T C = Q T . Thus, it follows that Q T ⇓ ÿ and ÿnally the thesis.
Proposition 2.15. If S is a barbed simulation up to ≡ then ≡ S ≡ is a barbed simulation.
Proof. Let P ≡ S ≡ Q, then there exist P ≡ P and Q ≡ Q such that (P ; Q ) ∈ S. Now, if P ↓ ÿ, by Lemma 2.13 we have that P ↓ ÿ and, since (P ; Q ) ∈ S, also Q ↓ ÿ and, by Lemma 2.13, also Q ↓ ÿ. Moreover, if P →P then also P →P withP ≡P . Since (P ; Q ) ∈ S, then Q →Q with (P ;Q ) ∈ S and, by Lemma 2.13 Q →Q with Q ≡Q. AsP ≡P ; (P ;Q ) ∈ S andQ ≡Q we get thatP ≡ S ≡Q and so the thesis. Proof. The following is a barbed simulation up to ≡:
I ⊆ {1; : : : ; n};p = {p Fi } i∈1:::n ; {Q; R; R 1 } ⊆ E; R -R 1 }
To prove this, consider (A; B) ∈ S, then:
• if A ↓ ÿ then we may have the following cases: 
Then also B → B and
Since Q may synchronize with p Fj (x):F j (x). Moreover, as m = m j we have that
Since Q may synchronize with p Fj (x):F j (x), then also B → B where
Finally note that for all R; (S spec (m) R; S(m)) R) ∈ S. Thus, S spec (m) -S(m).
Proof. One direction is obvious asF is compatible withF * . Thus, if process S guarantees spi-authentication, then SF will certainly guarantee weak spi-authentication.
For the other direction, the proof is by contradiction. Assume that S does not guarantee spi-authentication; then we will arrive at the contradiction that also SF does not guarantee the weak spi-authentication property. We suppose that it is possible to ÿnd a vector of continuationsF and a vector of messagesm such that SF (m) ≈ may SF spec (m). By Lemma 3.4, we have that SF spec (m)6 may SF (m), so the assumption that SF (m) ≈ may SF spec (m) implies that SF (m) may SF spec (m). Thus, there exists an experiment (T; ÿ) which is passed by SF (m) and is not passed by SF spec (m). Formally
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the channels ofF are neither in the sort of T nor in the one ofF. Indeed, in such a case, we could rename the channels in collision with the ones inF , obtaining another vector of continuations F which enjoys our requirements and such that S F does not satisfy weak spi-authentication. In principle, it could happen that F j helped the attacker in such a way that cannot be simulated by F j . However, F j can communicate nothing to the intruder that the intruder could not know. In fact, due to Assumption 2, we know that the processes F j (m j ) have no secrets in collision with the protocol part. Hence the interaction of the protocol with F j can be completely simulated by the intruder which may produce a copy of F j (m j ).
Thus, consider the following tester T as
and let Outs be the set {out F * i } i∈1:::n . Assume for a while that the following two inequalities hold:
From (i) the following holds:
As, by hypothesis, SF satisÿes weak spi-authentication, we derive SF spec (m) T ⇓ ÿ. Since ÿ = ∈ Outs, also (SF spec (m) T )\Outs ⇓ ÿ. Now, by inequality (ii), we have also that SF spec (m) T ⇓ ÿ, which leads to a contradiction (S would guarantee spi-authentication). We now prove the two inequalities (i) and (ii). For proving SF (m) T / (SF (m) T )\Outs, let us show that the following is a barbed weak simulation up to ≡:
I ⊆ {1; : : : ; n};p I = {p Fi } i∈I ;p I = {p F i } i∈I ; Q ∈ E;
where f is the relabeling function such that f(p Fi ) = p F i . Assume that (A; B) ∈ S then: • if A ↓ ÿ then we may have the following cases:
• Q ↓ ÿ, in this case also B ↓ ÿ, • T ↓ ÿ, in this case also B ↓ ÿ. • if A → A then we may have the following cases:
• Q → Q then also B → B for some B and (A ; B ) ∈ S, • T → T then also B → B for some B and (A ; B ) ∈ S,
• if there is a synchronization between Q pF i (m )
−→ Q and the preÿxed continuation p Fj (x):F j (x) then let J = I \{j} and
We also have that B → B where
. Thus, we have that B → B by means of a synchronization on the channel out F * j where
For proving (SF spec (m) T )\Outs / SF spec (m) T let us show that the following is a barbed weak simulation (up to ≡):
where f is the relabeling function such that f (p F i ) = p Fi . Assume that (A; B) ∈ S then: • if A ↓ ÿ then we may have the following cases:
• if there is a synchronization between a term out F * k (m k ) with k ∈ I 2 and a preÿxed continuation out F * l (x):F l (x) with l ∈ I , then let K = I \{k}:
We also have B → B by means of a synchronization on p F k with 
We have also that B → B where
and also B → B where
and (A ; B ) ∈ S.
Lemma 6.2. Assume that for every vector of messagesm; S spec (m)\C ≈ may k∈1::n F k (m k ). Then, S spec guarantees TNDC-authentication.
Proof. We have to prove that (S spec (m) X )\C ≈ may S spec (m)\C. One direction is trivial, as S spec (m)\C6 trace (S spec (m) X )\C and so, by Proposition 2.6, S spec (m)\C6 may (S spec (m) X )\C. Let us prove that (S spec (m) X )\C 6 may S spec (m)\C:
By the hypothesis we have that k∈1:::n F k (m k )6 may S spec (m)\C. Thus, if we prove that (S spec (m) X )\C6 may k∈1:::n F k (m k ), then we are done. We do this by showing that (S spec (m) X )\C / k∈1:::n F k (m k ) from which the result follows by Proposition 2.11. First of all, as S spec (m) is in form (2), we note that
for some Q ∈ E C∪p since, by deÿnition, the channels of the continuations are di erent from the ones in the protocol (see Note 1), i.e. they are di erent from C ∪p. Let us consider the following relation:
I ⊆ {1; : : : ; n};p I = {p Fi } i∈I ; Q ∈ E C∪pI ; {R;
We prove that S is a weak barbed simulation up to ≡. Suppose that (A; B) ∈ S then: 
So ≡ S ≡ is a weak barbed simulation and since we have that
Proof. By induction on the number n of activations in .
• n = 0: This case is simple. Due to the form of processes and speciÿcations, two processes SF (m) and SF spec (m) cannot exhibit a di erent behavior without performing some synchronizations on the channels inp.
• n+1: Let p Fi be the channel where the two processes perform the synchronization of the ÿrst activation in and let be a correct delivering scheme for Activations( ). Then
Then, we can see that also
Since is a correct delivering schema, we have that F (i) = F i , but we also know that F i = F j thus it follows F (i) = F j . Let R be Then, it is easy to see that S F (m ) F j (m (i) ) T ⇓ ÿ with a successful computation whose delivering schema is correct and is as restricted on I \{i} except for (l) = (i), where (l) = i and i = l. Thus, we can apply the inductive hypothesis and we obtain that also S spec F (m ) F (i) (m (i) ) T ⇓ ÿ by proving that SF spec (m) T ⇓ ÿ.
Proof. By contradiction, we assume S F does not guarantee weak spi-authentication. By Lemma 3.4, there exists an experiment (T; ÿ) which is passed by SF (m) and is not passed by SF spec (m).
By Lemma 6.7, it must be that at a certain point of the computation with the attacker T a conÿguration of the process S is reached such that one of the components sends a non-correct m to a continuation F i (according to Deÿnitions 6.5 and 6.6).
Our aim is to split the tester T in an attacker X and an observer T such that the attacker communicates only on the channels C and the observer only on the channels of the continuations. Because of the restriction on the sort of X we cannot do as in Proposition 3.9 to consider a di erent attacker who plays the role of some continuations F i . This role will be played by our observer T . Now, consider the shortest computation between the intruder T and the process S which leads the processes to send an incorrect value to a continuation F i l+1 . During this computation it is possible that the intruder T has committed with some continuation F j , i.e. it has received on some channel out F * j . Let B = (F i1 (m i1 ); : : : ; F i l (m i l )) be the ordered vector of channel=messages that the intruder has synchronized with. By our assumption on the fact that we consider the shortest computation which leads to a similar conÿguration we know that the intruder in these receptions has received only correct values.
As an attacker we consider a process X which is obtained from the process T where the receptions on the channels out F * i j are removed, by replacing the relative input variables with the correct message m ij .
Hence, we can write a process T which receives on the barbs in B, then receives a value on the channel out F * i l+1
and then it tests whether the received value is di erent from the possible correct ones (we use an if-then-else operator) and if so it commits on a special channel, say !. Proposition 6.10. Let P be a CryptoSPA process which can only execute a ÿnite number of output actions and such that ID(P) ⊆ D( I ). Then, for all Q ∈ E; P ≈ may Q i P ≈ trace Q.
Proof. By Proposition 2.6 we have that if P ≈ trace Q then P ≈ may Q. We now prove that if P6 may Q then P6 trace Q. Consider a trace of P. Since ID(P) ⊆ D( I ), then may contain only output messages that are in D( I ). Hence, we can construct a test T ∈ E I that executes a barb ÿ i the tested process can execute . It is su cient that the test checks that every received message is the correct one through the matching operator. We have that P T ⇓ ÿ, and by hypothesis, also Q T ⇓ ÿ. This implies that, by construction of T; must be also a trace for Q. Indeed, as we already stated, T is such that every message of Q is checked against the messages contained in . T executes ÿ only if every action of is executed.
We still have to prove that if Q6 may P then Q6 trace P. First, we show that Q can only provide a sequence of output messages in D( I ). Try to suppose that Q performs an output of a secret message after, say n, outputs of public messages. In this case, we can built a process T which receives n + 1 values. T composed with Q receives this value. If we compose this tester with P we must obtain that P may send a ÿnite set of values m 1 ; : : : m l that are not secret, after a sequence of n outputs. The situation where P is not able to send a sequence of n + 1 messages should directly contradict assumption Q6 may P. Hence, we can simply modify T in such a way that it tests whether the last message received is di erent from the messages m 1 ; : : : m l , if so it commits on a special channel !. Now, we get an absurd, since Q passes (T; !) while P cannot do it.
Next, it is easy to see that Q cannot execute input actions. If it could do so, for example after a sequence of output of public messages, then we could consider a test that sends an output to Q and then executes on a special barb !. This test cannot succeed with P, but as Q6 may P, we obtain a contradiction.
We have proved that Q may only perform outputs of public messages. Now, to show that Q6 may P implies Q6 trace P we can proceed as at the beginning of the proof. Hence, the thesis follows. By contradiction, suppose that S F (d 1 ; : : : :d n ) = ∈ NDC. Then it must be that for some intruder X the compound process (S F (d 1 ; : : : :d n ) X )\C is not equivalent to S F (d 1 ; : : : :d n )\C. Now note that, by the well-formedness condition (WFC1) we made on the process, we must have S F (d 1 ; : : : :d n )\C ≈ trace i∈1:::n out F (d i ). Thus, it must be the case that (S F (d 1 ; : : : :d n ) X )\C produces an incorrect trace, i.e., which is not a trace for n out F (d n ). This happens if the ordered sequence of messages emitted is not a preÿx of some permutation of the sequence d 1 ; : : : ; d n . But, by construction of S , we have that also (S (d 1 ; : : : :d n ) X )\C produces a sequence of action commit res whose ordered sequence of messages is not correct. In fact, each activation of a continuation F(d) is preceded by the issuing of the action commit res(B; A i ; d) for some A i . Now, the same trace is produced by the process (S (d 1 ; : : : :d n ) X )\C. But, since this process satisÿes Agreement, this means that in the incorrect trace there is also an incorrect sequence of messages delivered on the channels running ini. This is impossible since it is easy to see that, by construction, S (d 1 ; : : : :d n ) produces only correct sequences of outputs in this channel.
